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R
esearch on highly pathogenic organisms is crucial for medi-
cine and public health, and we strongly support it. This work
creates a foundation of new knowledge that provides critical in-
sights around the world’s most deadly infectious diseases, and it
can lay groundwork for the future development of new diagnos-
tics,medicines,andvaccines.Almostallsuchresearchcanbeper-
formed in ways that pose negligible or no risk of epidemic or
globalspreadofanovelpathogen.However,researchthataimsto
create new potential pandemic pathogens (PPP) (1)—novel mi-
crobes that combine likely human virulence with likely efﬁcient
transmission in humans—is an exception to that rule. While this
research represents a tiny portion of the experimental work done
in infectious disease research, it poses extraordinary potential
risks to the public.
Experimentsthatcreatethepossibilityofinitiatingapandemic
should be subject to a rigorous quantitative risk assessment and a
search for safer alternatives before they are approved or per-
formed.Yetarigorousandtransparentriskassessmentprocessfor
this work has not yet been established. This is why we support the
recently announced moratorium on funding new “gain-of-
function” (GOF) experiments that enhance mammalian trans-
missibility or virulence in severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and inﬂu-
enza viruses. This realm of work roughly corresponds with the
work we have termed PPP above. Because the term “gain of func-
tion” in other contexts can be used to describe techniques of sci-
entiﬁc research that have nothing to do with the creation of novel
potentialpandemicpathogens,wethinkthetermcanbetoobroad
and can mislead. Throughout this commentary, we focus on re-
searchdesignedtocreatePPPstrainsofinﬂuenzavirus,thetypeof
research that initially attracted attention, leading to the morato-
rium and for which the most discussion has already occurred.
Other types of gain-of-function research on inﬂuenza and studies
intended to enhance pathogenicity or transmissibility of MERS
and SARS coronaviruses may or may not ﬁt the deﬁnition of PPP
research and further clariﬁcation is needed and ongoing. As we
discuss near the end of this article, it will be essential to clarify the
different risks and beneﬁts entailed by different types of experi-
ments covered by the funding pause (2).
The purpose of this research funding pause is to complete “a
robustandbroaddeliberativeprocess. . .thatresultsintheadop-
tion of a new [U.S. Government] gain-of-function research pol-
icy”(3).Themoratoriumwouldstopnewfundingforthefollow-
ing:
. . . research projects that may be reasonably anticipated to
confer attributes to inﬂuenza, MERS, or SARS viruses
such that the virus would have enhanced pathogenicity
and/or transmissibility in mammals via the respiratory
route. The research funding pause would not apply to
characterization or testing of naturally occurring inﬂu-
enza, MERS, and SARS viruses, unless the tests are reason-
ably anticipated to increase transmissibility and/or patho-
genicity. (3)
The new U.S. Government (USG) policy also encourages the
currently funded U.S. Government and nongovernment research
communitytojoininadoptingavoluntarypauseonresearchthat
meets this gain-of-function deﬁnition. Some 18 NIH research
projectsthatpossiblymeetthatdeﬁnitionhavebeenidentiﬁed(2).
The moratorium does not apply to the larger infectious disease
research portfolio supported by the U.S. Government. In partic-
ular,itdoesnotaffectdiseasesurveillanceorvaccinedevelopment
programs. During the moratorium, a deliberative process will oc-
cur that will be led by the National Science Advisory Board for
BiosecurityandtheNationalAcademyofSciences.Thisprocessis
intended to produce “recommendations for risk mitigation, po-
tential courses of action in light of this assessment, and propose
methodologies for the objective and rigorous assessment of risks
and potential beneﬁts that might be applied to the approval and
conduct of individual experiments or classes of experiments” (3).
In this commentary, we discuss key elements of risk analysis
and offer an example of an approach that could be taken. We
describe beneﬁt analysis, offering an account of the kinds of ben-
eﬁts that are relevant and our own view of those at this point. We
note other factors that are important to consider. And we argue
thatamoratoriumistherightapproachuntilarigorous,objective,
and credible risk assessment process can be established.
RISK ANALYSIS
Risk assessment for GOF work should be quantitative, objective,
and credible. Extensive qualitative arguments have been made on
both sides of this issue, and these arguments have not provided
sufﬁcientclarityorevidencetoresolveconcernsoridentifyacon-
sensuspathforward.Quantitativeassessmentsshouldnowbeper-
formed so as to provide speciﬁc calculations and information to
informdecisions.Itisalsoimportantfortheseriskassessmentsto
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process should be directed by those without a clear personal stake
in the outcome, just as peer review of science is performed by
those without a direct interest in the outcome. The credibility of
the risk assessment will depend both on the rigor of the quantita-
tive process and the perceived objectivity of the process.
Therecordoflaboratoryincidentsandaccidentalinfectionsin
biosafety level 3 (BSL3) laboratories provides a starting point for
quantifyingrisk.Concentratingonthegenerationoftransmissible
variants of avian inﬂuenza, we provide an illustrative calculation
ofthesortthatwouldbeperformedingreaterdetailinafullerrisk
analysis.Previouspublicationshavesuggestedsimilarapproaches
to this problem (1, 4).
Insurers and risk analysts deﬁne risk as the product of proba-
bility times consequence. Data on the probability of a laboratory-
associatedinfectioninU.S.BSL3labsusingselectagentsshowthat
4 infections have been observed over 2,044 laboratory-years of
observation, indicating at least a 0.2% chance of a laboratory-
acquired infection (5) per BSL3 laboratory-year. An alternative
data source is from the intramural BSL3 labs at the National In-
stitutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), which report
in a slightly different way: 3 accidental infections in 634,500
person-hoursofworkbetween1982and2003,orabout1acciden-
talinfectionforevery100full-timeperson-years(2,000h)ofwork
(6).
A simulation model of an accidental infection of a laboratory
workerwithatransmissibleinﬂuenzavirusstrainestimatedabout
a 10 to 20% risk that such an infection would escape control and
spreadwidely(7).Alternativeestimatesfromsimplemodelsrange
fromabout5%to60%.Multiplyingtheprobabilityofanacciden-
tal laboratory-acquired infection per lab-year (0.2%) or full-time
worker-year (1%) by the probability that the infection leads to
global spread (5% to 60%) provides an estimate that work with a
novel, transmissible form of inﬂuenza virus carries a risk of be-
tween 0.01% and 0.1% per laboratory-year of creating a pan-
demic,usingtheselectagentdata,orbetween0.05%and0.6%per
full-time worker-year using the NIAID data.
Readily transmissible inﬂuenza, once widespread, has never
before been controlled before it spreads globally, and inﬂuenza
pandemics historically have infected about 24 to 38% of the
world’spopulation(8,9).Thecase-fatalityratioofanovelstrainis
of course unpredictable. The worst case might be a case-fatality
ratio similar to that of avian H5N1 inﬂuenza virus in people,
which approaches 60% (10). A greatly attenuated version of the
same virus might have a case-fatality ratio of “only” 1%.
Again, multiplying the pandemic attack rate (24% to 38%)
times the global population (~7 billion) times the case-fatality
ratio (1% to 60%) would produce an estimate of between 2 mil-
lion and 1.4 billion fatalities from a pandemic of a highly virulent
inﬂuenza virus strain.
Putting all these numbers together, the select agent data sug-
gest that a laboratory-year of experimentation on virulent, trans-
missible inﬂuenza virus might have an 0.01% to 0.1% chance of
killing2millionto1.4billion,oranexpecteddeathtollof2,000to
1.4 million fatalities per BSL3-laboratory-year. From the NIAID
data, for each full-time person-year of BSL-3 work, we might ex-
pect a toll of between 10,000 and over 10 million.
These numbers should be discussed, challenged, and modiﬁed
to ﬁt the particularities of speciﬁc types of PPP experiments. For
creation of novel, transmissible, virulent inﬂuenza virus strains,
theymayoverstatetheriskforthefollowingreasons:(i)mostsuch
work is done in BSL3 labs, which may be safer than BSL3; (ii)
controlmeasures,includingvaccinationandantiviralprophylaxis
of laboratory workers, might reduce the risk of infection and of
spread, although none of these is perfect; (iii) the human case-
fatalityratioofanavianinﬂuenzavirusstrainthatgainstransmis-
sibility could be below 1%; (iv) transmissibility in laboratory an-
imalsdoesnotnecessarilyindicatetransmissibilityinhumans(11,
12); and (v) novel strategies of molecular biocontainment (13), if
employed,mightreducetheriskofhumantransmissionofastrain
used in transmission experiments in other mammals.
On the other hand, these numbers may understate the risk
because (i) the select agent calculation includes in its numerator
only BSL3 labs, but in the denominator, BSL3 as well as BSL2 and
BSL4“registeredentities”asseparateﬁguresforBSL3arenotpub-
licly available (5); (ii) the rate of accidents is calculated for U.S.
labs, while GOF experiments are performed in many countries; if
this work expands to some of the many countries with less strin-
gent standards than those in the United States (14), risks could be
higher; and (iii) the costs of an accidental pandemic considered
herearedeathsonly,butadditionallosseswouldincludescientiﬁc
credibility, nonfatal health outcomes, economic and educational
losses, etc.
The illustrative calculations above show that approximate risk
estimates are possible for creation of PPP strains of inﬂuenza vi-
rus. During the deliberative process initiated with this morato-
rium, the risk assessment approach that is established should be
able to provide calculations that reﬂect these and other available
probability and consequence estimates and take into account the
range of modifying factors, including those just described. The
riskassessmentprocessshouldalsobeabletoprovidecalculations
related to PPP experiments where the risks are harder to calculate
given more limited data, such as enhancement of coronavirus
pathogenicity in small mammals.
BENEFIT ANALYSIS
On the surface, analyzing the beneﬁts of PPP experimentation
would seem more difﬁcult. In the cumulative process of knowl-
edge acquisition that is science, it is hard to see far ahead where a
particulartypeofresearchmaylead.Ontheotherhand,scientists
make judgments about the relative merits of experimental ap-
proaches on a daily basis in their roles as investigators and grant
reviewers. Doing and funding science constitute a process of se-
vere winnowing (especially severe in today’s tight funding cli-
mate) in which we choose to pursue one approach and not to
pursue others based on judgments of which approaches are ex-
pected to have the lowest cost, highest probability of success, and
greatest yield of valuable ﬁndings, among other considerations.
Implicit in this process is the idea of opportunity cost. In priori-
tizing the week’s or the year’s research work, we do not judge in
isolation whether a particular experiment should be done or not
done. We decide how to allocate our time and funding among
possible approaches, devoting resources to the portfolio of efforts
that seems most promising. Similar prioritizations are made by
funders when they decide which kinds of research will be funded
and which research will not.
The analysis of beneﬁts of PPP experiments should follow this
familiar approach. The choice is not between doing PPP experi-
ments and doing nothing. Rather, the appropriate question is,
withinaportfolioofscientiﬁcandpublichealthactivitiesdesigned
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haps,inourportfolioofinfectiousdiseasecountermeasuresmore
broadly),whatarethebeneﬁtsofincludingPPPapproachescom-
pared to the beneﬁts of expanding other parts of the portfolio to
use the resources in another way? From the perspective of public
health and the practical goal of preventing and treating ﬂu, alter-
native approaches include those which, like PPP experiments,
seek to enhance our scientiﬁc understanding of biology, patho-
genesis, and transmission. Alternatives also include efforts to de-
velop treatments and prevention measures, including surveil-
lance, through means other than improving our basic biological
understanding of inﬂuenza (4). This approach is shown graphi-
cally in Fig. 1, which also depicts the risks of PPP research. Such
risksshouldbeweighedagainsttherisksofalternatives,whichare
typically much smaller or even negligible. Figure 1 embodies the
idea that PPP research should be a component of our research
portfolio only if devoting resources to PPP studies at the expense
of alternatives has net beneﬁts that outweigh the unique risks of
PPP studies.
This comparative approach to beneﬁts should be informed by
a hard-nosed look at the beneﬁts that are readily achievable by
PPP experiments, not hypothetical outcomes that could someday
lead to unspeciﬁed beneﬁts. We acknowledge the possibility that
PPP experiments may lead to beneﬁts we cannot today envision.
Butsocouldtheexperimentsthataredoneintheirplaceifsupport
for PPP is reallocated to other scientiﬁc approaches. The possibil-
ity of unanticipated beneﬁts is surely a reason to do science, but it
is not a reason to favor PPP approaches over others, unless some
speciﬁccasecanbemadefortheuniqueyetunanticipatedbeneﬁts
of PPP work. Such a case seems hard to imagine for beneﬁts that
are by assumption unanticipated.
For example, it has been suggested that mutations or pheno-
types identiﬁed through PPP experiments could be used to sort
throughthemassivediversityofnonhumaninﬂuenzavirusstrains
toprioritizethosethatshouldtriggercountermeasures,including
prepandemic vaccine manufacturing. While this is possible in
principle, there are many practical barriers to achieving public
health beneﬁts of this sort from PPP studies (15). Lists of muta-
tions, and even phenotypes, associated with PPP studies can be
compiled and compared against isolates of inﬂuenza viruses from
birds and other nonhuman sources (16). We know that these lists
are unreliable and can even be misleading: the mutations in hem-
agglutinin identiﬁed by two prominent PPP experiments with
H5N1 do not reliably confer human receptor speciﬁcity even for
other H5N1 viruses (17). The E627K mutation in the PB2 gene,
known as a virulence and transmissibility determinant before
GOF experiments (16, 18, 19), found repeatedly in GOF experi-
mentsinH5N1(20,21),andusedforpandemicriskassessmentin
H7 viruses (16), was found in some isolates of the H1N1pdm
strain in 2009, leading to concern about possible increased viru-
lence and transmissibility. Yet it conferred neither trait in this
genetic background (22).
FIG 1 Weighing risks and beneﬁts. The beneﬁts (squares) of spending a ﬁxed quantity of resources on a portfolio of activities, including PPP research (red),
other approaches to inﬂuenza virus virology (green), and other public health activities to defeat inﬂuenza (yellow), should be weighed against the beneﬁts of a
portfolioinwhichtheotheractivitiesareexpandedtousetheresourcesfreedbynotsupportingPPPactivities,reﬂectingtheopportunitycostofthePPPresearch.
If there are net beneﬁts to including PPP activities in the portfolio, then they should be weighed against the net risks created by PPP experiments, which in the
case of inﬂuenza transmissibility enhancement, we have argued (see the main text, Risk Analysis) are exceptionally high. The balance may differ for other
activities, but this comparison of beneﬁts of portfolios with and without gain-of-function experiments is the appropriate comparison, with any net beneﬁts
weighed against net risks. univ, universal.
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notypeonthegeneticbackgroundinwhichamutationisfound—
make prediction of pandemic risk for any given strain more of an
art than a science. Indeed, the very presumption that we will see
human cases of an incipient pandemic before that pandemic oc-
curs has never been met in practice (23): we have never observed
zoonoticcasesofanyﬂuvirusbeforeitcausedapandemic.Thisis
not to deny that PPP experiments provide any useful data for
surveillance and prioritization. Rather, it is to say that other ap-
proaches can also identify such predictors (as in the case of the
PB2 mutation [11, 13, 14]) and that the ability to use markers of
putative transmissibility or virulence to make reliable predictions
remainsfarinthefuture(23).Thefactthatsomeanalystsconsider
mutationsidentiﬁedinPPPexperimentswhenassessingthreatsof
viruses found in surveillance does not mean that the use of such
mutationsimprovesthepredictions,aclaimforwhichwehaveno
evidence because no pandemic strain has ever been identiﬁed in
advance. The analysis of beneﬁts of PPP creation should reﬂect
this state of science.
According to some proponents, the most valuable scientiﬁc
ﬁnding of experiments to make ferret-transmissible mutants of
inﬂuenza A/H5N1 is the deﬁnitive proof that such variants could
beproducedwithasmallnumberofmutations.Thiscouldnotbe
deﬁnitively proven without doing the PPP experiment to manu-
facture a potentially pandemic variant of H5N1 (24). While it is
now undeniable that ferret-transmissible mutants of inﬂuenza
A/H5N1 can be created experimentally, the impact on scientiﬁc
opinionabouttheriskofapandemicfromH5N1hasbeenhardto
gauge.Priortothegain-of-functionexperiments,therewasawide
range of expert opinion on the likelihood of an H5N1 pandemic
(25). Some inﬂuenza experts questioned whether H5N1 was a
major pandemic threat. After the publication of the experiments
producing potentially pandemic H5N1, one prominent member
of this group, Peter Palese, noted the shortcomings of the ferret
model for humans and correctly concluded that the question of
whether H5N1 can transmit efﬁciently in people remains unset-
tled (11), as it must until the phenomenon is directly observed in
nature. From a practical perspective, responsible policy makers
and public health leaders should have been planning for the pos-
sibility of an H5N1 pandemic before PPP experiments on H5N1
wereundertaken.Insomecountriesoftheworld,theywerestock-
piling vaccines against H5N1 (26, 27) and making plans for non-
pharmaceutical (8) interventions in the event of a pandemic. The
same remains true after the experiments. We have observed no
discernibleinﬂuenceoftheH5N1PPPexperimentsonH5N1pol-
icy preparations.
CALCULATING OTHER FACTORS
During the moratorium, progress should also be made in calcu-
lating the risks associated with potential deliberate misuse of PPP
strains and with potential deliberate misuse of the information
that is created and published following PPP experimental work.
This calculation should take into account the possibility of delib-
erate theft and dissemination by either persons working within a
labortheftbythoseoutsidethelab.Whiletheprobabilityofthisis
likelytobeverylowformostscientistsandmostlaboratories,itis
not zero. There is a precedent of scientists using pathogens from
their own labs to cause harm. And as with potential accidents,
while the probability may be very low, the consequences could be
very high.
This assessment should also take into account the possibility
that scientists may deliberately misuse the knowledge gained and
published following the experiments by recreating the novel PPP
strains in another laboratory using methods from published pa-
pers and then purposefully disseminating it. This possibility is
typically dismissed out of hand by many scientists. But before
dismissingthatpossibility,ananalysisbyanassemblyofexpertsin
the best position to make that judgment should be conducted.
What is the possibility that individuals or groups who would seek
to carry out such an act would develop the capacity and skill to
carry it out? Given that once knowledge is published, it will be
availableforever,thesequestionsarenotjustaboutthepossibility
of this happening in today’s world but also anytime in the future.
Despite the inherent uncertainties in trying to answer these ques-
tions, they should be answered with the best possible expertise.
Similarly, the moratorium should be used as a time to answer,
or at least be addressing, another major issue as well: the interna-
tional approach to funding, authorizing, and overseeing PPP. An
accident or deliberate act involving PPP anywhere in the world
couldconceivablyimpactthepublicaroundtheworld.Therefore,
the community of nations has an abiding interest to set common
rules for how this work will be pursued. However, at this point,
few countries have begun any kind of deliberative process on an
approach to research with these unique dangers. Country X
shouldhavetherighttoknowifthisworkisgoingonincountryY,
and if so, what is being done to ensure it is done with the greatest
safety and security. But currently, the way country X ﬁnds out
about PPP work being done elsewhere in the world is when it is
publishedinasciencejournal.Giventheprestigethatsomescien-
tistshavereceivedforpursuingPPPresearch,itwouldbesurpris-
ing if scientists from countries around the world did not increas-
ingly pursue it. As comparatively less experienced labs decided to
pursue this work, this will increase potential dangers.
A MORATORIUM IS THE RIGHT STEP
There are prominent scientists who agree that there are potential
serious dangers to this work and agree that a risk assessment pro-
cess is needed but who are opposed to a moratorium being im-
posed while such a risk assessment process is undertaken. They
believe that a moratorium should be avoided for reasons that in-
clude the potential damage it can do to the funding and work of
that lab and to the careers of those involved in the work.
We have a different view. A substantial number of scientists
agree that there are extraordinary potential consequences of the
work(15).Thereisnorigorous,objective,credibleriskassessment
process to judge the risks and beneﬁts of proceeding with it. We
believethattheresponsiblecourseistotakearesearchpauseuntil
such a risk assessment process is established, which creates a
stronger basis for decisions and actions. This is not solely a scien-
tiﬁcissue.Itisascientiﬁcandpublichealthandsafetyissue,andit
is an issue in which the public itself has an abiding interest.
We have no interest in stopping scientists from doing their
workorpreventinglaboratoriesfromreceivingfunding.Thenar-
row and deﬁned area of GOF research intended to create novel
potential pandemic strains should be put on pause until the risk
assessment process is completed. The same laboratories and sci-
entists whose work has been stopped by the moratorium are free
and able to pursue all other avenues of infectious disease research
exceptforthatnarrowlydeﬁnedbytheGOFdeﬁnitioninthenew
policy; to the extent that other activities not meeting the narrow
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investigatorsorderingorrequestingworkstoppage,theboundar-
ies of the funding pause should be quickly clariﬁed to allow im-
portantalternativeworkonﬂutocontinue.Wenotethatthereare
more than 250 NIH-funded projects listed as active with titles
containingMERS,SARS,coronavirus,orinﬂuenza(28),ofwhich
18 have been affected by the funding pause. The number that
remainonpausemaybefurtherreducedbynegotiationsbetween
investigators and the NIH, which are now under way, that will
deﬁnewhichprojectstrulyarewithinthescopeofthemoratorium
and which do not meet its terms and can resume.
Thecharacterandscopeoftheriskassessmentsthatareapplied
are important. To establish methodologies and approaches for
risk assessment and risk mitigation for this context, it would be
valuable to start with a global assessment of the risks and beneﬁts
of this realm of research, identifying the common aspects of risk
and beneﬁt within PPP experiments and other approaches cov-
ered in the funding pause. For example, any risk assessment
should include estimates of the probabilities of accidental infec-
tion and extensive spread, as well as estimates of the impacts of
these events should they occur. The speciﬁc values of these esti-
mated parameters will differ for different types of experiments. It
will then be necessary to set standards and expectations for the
quality and characteristics of risk-beneﬁt assessments for individ-
ualexperiments,forexample,todistinguishcoronavirusresearch
frominﬂuenzaresearch,enhancementsofpathogenicityfromen-
hancements of transmissibility, and other important distinctions.
Given that the term “risk assessment” is used to mean different
things by different people, an agreement on an approach to indi-
vidualriskassessmentswouldbeneededtoensurerigorandcred-
ibility. Once this kind of analytic structure is established, individ-
ualriskassessmentsforGOFexperimentsthatmeetthedeﬁnition
in the new USG policy (3) should become the norm before such
experiments are funded. Crucially, this process should be quanti-
tative,ratherthanrelyingonunquantiﬁedandunveriﬁableassur-
ances that particular laboratories are safe.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of this risk assessment process are important not only
to the U.S. Government, which had been a major funder of PPP
experiments, but also to other funders, regulators, and investiga-
tors worldwide who consider such experiments. Our support for
the funding pause and associated deliberative process does not
indicate that we would support a permanent end to all experi-
ments subject to the pause. There may be research endeavors that
are subject to the moratorium that have a risk-beneﬁt proﬁle suf-
ﬁciently favorable to justify their resumption once risks and ben-
eﬁtshavebeenexplicitlysetforth.After2yearsofdebate,wethink
the balance is evidently unfavorable for experiments to enhance
avian inﬂuenza virus transmissibility, but other classes of experi-
ments may be different. In the meantime, the moratorium is an
appropriate and responsible step while dedicated and rigorous
efforts are made to understand the risks and beneﬁts of this work.
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